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SPACE SHUTTLE WHEELS AND BRAKES
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Downey, Californla
ABSTRACT
The Space Shuttle Orbiter wheels have been subjected to a combination of tests which are
different than any previously conducted in the aerospace industry. The major testing difference is
the computer generated dynami c landing profiles used during the certification process which
mubjected the wheels and tires to simulated landing loading conditions.
The orbiter brakes use a unique combination of carbon composite linings and beryllium heat siak
to minimize weight. The development of a new lining retention method was necessary in order to with-
stand the high temperature generated during the braking roll. As with many programs, the volume into
which this hardware had to fit was established early in the program, with no provisions made foe
growth to offset the continuously increasing predicted orbiter landing weisht.
Both wheels end brakes were designed, manufactured, and certified for Orbiter operational use
by B. F. Goodrich Company, Troy, Ohio.
I, INTRODUCTION
The Space Shuttle, as with all space vehicles, requires a minlmumweight configuration in order
to maximize the payload weight to orbit lift capability. Using this philosophy, and drawing from the
years of experience and techniques utilized in c_ercia_and military aircraft applications, the
wheel/tire/brake/shock strut configuration was sized on a predicted Space Shuttle Orbiter landlngJ
welght established very early in the program.
The main wheel baseline design has many of the same features as a commercial aircraft wheel.
An interface with the axle, brake and tire, an over-inflatlon plug, thermal fuse release plug,
inflation valve, bearing housings, grease seals, and pressure seals.
A "live axle" configuration was chosen for the nose gear which differs in design for moat
current aircraft but has been used in experimental and operational aircraft. With the live axle
design, the wheels are splined to the axle and rotate as a unit on bearings mounted in the shock
strut. The resulting _orotating wheels reduces the tendency for wheel shimmy and, therefore,
increases the stability of the assembly.
Preliminary studies by B. F. Goodrich were conducted to evaluate various combinations of materials
for both the brake heat sink and friction surfaces in order to minimize the brake weight for both
reusable and non-reusable applications. The combinations studied included full _arbon composite
heat sinks, conventional beryllium heat sinks with mechanically attached sintered metallic friction
materials and the combination of carbon composite linings and beryllium heat sink. The carbon
composite lining/beryllium heat sink was finally selected for its relatively low peak temperatures
(compared to steel and carbon composites) which allowed the minimum weight reusable heat sink. The
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carbon composite heat sink was the lowest weight for a non-reusable application, requiring new wheels
and tires to be installed after every stop." In comparing the levels of brake energies required for a
normal landing when the brakes would be usable and a maximum brake eners7 stop where the brakes and
wheels were expendable, the composite llning/berylllum heac sink was the most efficient for the very
critical Space Shuttle weight requirements.
II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ORBITER MAIN WHEEL
The Orbiter main wheel (See Figure i) is similar to conventional aircraft wheels in most respects.
It is made in two halves machined from 70Ag-T73 forgln_s and joined together by eighteen tie bolts
and nuts of MP35 multi-phase 240 Ksl material.
The inboard wheel half has a 4340 steel sleeve pressed into the hub and supports the inboard
bearing and grease seal. The wheel half, also contains the ports for the three thermal fuse plugs,
over-lnflatlon plug and inflation valve. Elevon brake drive lugs which interface wlCh the brake
rotors are also part of the inboard half and are protected from wear by 4130 steel hard chrome
plated drive channels.
The outboard half contains the outboard bearing, grease seal and has mounting provisions for the
hub cap.
The bearings are a standard Timken bearing size with special modifications and processing to help
withstand the Orbiter landing speeds and loads.
Tire pressure sealing is accompllahed by the compression of an 0-ring in a seal cavity between
the wheel'halves. The 0-ring ma_erlal and seal geometry was established as the resul_ of s separate
NASA/B. F_ Goodrich study contract. Extremely low leakage rate of the wheel/tire assembly was
necessary because of the long "storage" time from gear retraction ac vehicle mating to gear
extension at landing. Access to the wheel wells for tire pressure check and reinflation during this
time period was not possible.
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Ill. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ORBITER NOSE WHEEL
The nose wheel (See Figure 2) differs from mosC convenrlonal nose wheels in that ir is mounted
on a "live" axle with coroCating wheels. That is, the axle rotates with Che wheels using bearings
mounted in the nose gear strut, thereby, eliminating the bearings from _he wheel and replacing _bem
with a spline/bushing configuration.
The nose wheel configuration is similar to the main wheel except for the lack of brake system
interface. It is made in two halves of the sam6meterial, bol_ed together by attachments of _he
same material and has thermal fuse plugs, over-inflatlon plug and an inflation valve.
Thermal fuse plugs are used as blowout procectlon againsc nose wheel well overheat from plasma
flow rather Chart brake heac as in the case of the main wheel. Pressure sealing is accomplished in
the same manner as the main wheel.
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IV. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ORBITER }4AIN WHEEL BRAI_
The Orbiter brake (See Figure 3) is a four rotor, multiple disk brake using bezTlllumas the
heat sink. The friction surfaces are carbon composlte linings mechanically attached to the
beryllium heat sink surfaces. The brake •suembly consists of a pressure place, back plate, rotors,
statorm, support torque tube and a hydraulic actuation piston housing. The piston housing has two
separate hydraulic circuits for redundant actuation. The brake assembly is bolted to the landing gear
shock strut with a bracket resister to the axle for support of the outboard end of the brake assembly.
V. WHEEL DESIGN CHALLEWIE TO OPERATIONAL CERTIFICATION
Nodlfication to the wheel/tire testing philosophy, that is, the addition of the dynamic landing
load profiles had little effect upon the original nose wheel deslsn. The nose wheel loading is not
impacted by cros_indm and only slight changes occur U the result of total vehicle weight change.
This is because the nose gear is a seml-free castor design end can react a limited side load and
the nose sear carries such s small percentage of the total vehicle static weight. In addition, the
pitch over rate and resulting nose gear impact load o_ "slap do_u" has not changed. Therefore, the
remaining portion of the text will address the challenges which had to be solved to certify the
main wheel and brake.
As with many progra_m! require.me, haS change over a period of time, end the Orbiter was certainly
not dlf£erent. Not only.dld the vehicle landing weight Increase dramatically from the initial levels,
put the methods of dynamic landing load profile s/mal•tion testing currently in use had never been
performed on an aircraft wheel/tire •ssembly in the past. This advancement of the state-of-the-art
caused several failures during the certiflc•tion process.
The original or baseline wheel assembly design (gee Figure 4) is similar to conventional
aircraft wheels used throughout the aerospace industry. The baseline wheel w•m used during five
Approach and Landing Tests (ALT) where the Orbiter was released at.altitude from the 7A7 carrier
aircraft to prove the flying and landing ability of the Orbiter. However, the Orbiter vehicle
weight increased from approximately I$0,0OOQ for kiT to 227,000 pounds for an operational abort
condition. The weight was subsequently increased again to the present 240,000 pound level. What
are now called dynamic landing load profile teats were added to the baseline conventional I_L
specification requirements st this time in the prograu_, lkecAuse of the dramatic increase in loading
conditions due to these ch•nges, f•ilures in the wheel bearings beg•n to occur.
The dynamic load profiles (See Figure 5) arm generated by computer progr_ing that "lands"
the Orbiter under given conditions of weight, velocity, sets surface configuration, c. S. location,
tire sldeload resistance capability, angle of •it•ok, etc. Using these conditions, values for
tire/wheel radial load, tire velocity, yaw angle a_d later•l load are obtained and used as inputs to
the Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) sutomatad.dyn_ter.
In the baseline wheel conflguration, the inboard bearing is located at approximately the tire
centerline end is considerably larger then the-_utboard be•ring. With the advent of the dynamic
profiles the increased lateral load and corresponding increased moment on the wheel resulted in
bearing failures.
At this point, a major redesign and development testing of the wheel was undertaken. The
final wheel configuration (See Figure 1) which is still, •s of this writing, being tested under
straight roll, maintained the same interf•ces between the wheel, brake and tire but the bearing
configuration was drastically changed. By •ddin8 • steel sleeve pressed into the inboard wheel
half, the distance between the bearluss w•s increamed and thereby equalized the load distribution
on the bearings.
The use of the steel sleeve was required to carry the large cantilevered inboard bearings load
end still fit within the inner diameter of the brake torque tube. Installation of the insert, however,
provided to be • major desisn problem During initial tests, it was discovered that the insert
rotated in the inner wheel half when installed with approximately 0.007 inch interference. The
interference was increased in steps until it reached the presently used wbopplng 0.022 inch
interference.
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During the testing to solve the sleeve rotation problem, a parallel program of bearing
configuration, grease and bearing axlal preload teat series was being conducted. The tests
showed that by "manicuring" and adding a phosphate process to a standard tapered roller bearings
and installing them with a high axial preload, dramatically increased the load capability. The
high preload is contrary to instructions in automobile maintenance manual for fron_ wheel bearing
installation.
The preload is applied as a measure of wheel rolling resistance and requires approximately
1500 fort pounds torque on the axle nut.
The initial redesigned or '_eavy duty" wheel, flown on STS-I, had a second or redundan_
O-ring added at the split line to help reduce pressure loss during mated and orbit operations (See
Figure 6). The O-ring groove placeman_ and configuration proved to be a s_ress riser causing a
complete circumferential crack in the outboard wheel half during the straight roll test.
The next configuration flown on STS-2, 3, As and 5 removed the second O-ring groove but failed
in two areas at approximately 800 miles of straight roll. Cracks occurred in _he _nboard half
originating from the fuse plug hole and in the outboard half in the tie bolt hole at the wheel
split line.
In the third coufiguratlou, flown on STS-6, the fuse plug holes were repositioued to a reduced
stress area and the outboard wheel half web thlckness was increased and a larger radius added in the
tie bolt hole at the split line. At the 500 mile point of straight roll for this configuration,
non-destruction inspection revealed a crack in the steel sleeve at the outer surface of the bearing
cup housing. The failure was traced co an inclusion in the 45_0 steel material just below the
outer diameter surface.
For the latest sleeve configuration, flown on STS-7, as of this writing is again in the
straight roll test phase; the material specification was changed which limits the allowable size
and number of inclusions. In addition, a sho_ peening process was added to the highly stressed
bearing housing area.
VIo BRAKE DESIGN CHALLENGE TO OPERATIONAL USE
The main wheel brake design (See Figure 3) is an extension of the technology developed by
B. F. Goodrich on other aircraft progr_m_ but with special emphasis on weight savings and
performance. The beryllium heat sink is used on the m_lltary C-SA aod F-I4 aircraft. However,
the combination of beryllium heat sink and mechanically attached carbon composite linings is
used for _he first time on the Orbiter.
As the program progressed, changes were made to the design requirements from a single stop
and replacement to a _l_iple stop and refurbishment; Results of development _es_s on various
combination of heat sink and friction linin_ materials as well as _he design requirements changes
led to the selection of beryllium as the heat sink and carbon composite for the linings.
_eryllium was chosen for its light weight an_ efficient heat absorption capability and carbon
composite was chosen because of its great wear resistant, light weight, high strength, and high
temperature capability.
The major problems encountered iu the development and certification testin_ were the method
of mechanical attachment and physical configuration of the linings (See Figure 7). Several
iterations of attachment, materials, and proceaeiu_ were tried before the final configuration was
established. Included in the assembly are 1722 Rhodi_ plated steel for the "T" clips used to
react the braking torque; Columbium rivets with molybdenum washers to attach the lining segment;
and monel rivets co attach the "T" clips to the beryllium disks.
DesiKn changes were also made in the attachment of the back plate to the torque tube and Co
the hydraulic piston seal configuration.
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Certification testing included those normally associated with conventional aircraft brakes along
with hydraulic burst and pressure cycle endurance tests. Because there was not a method to conduct
the normal rejected takeoff test on the Orbiter, a simulated landing roll brake test was conducted
using a dynamometer. The specification requirement stated that the brake assembly shall be capable
of absorbing 36.5 million foot-pounds of eners7 in five separate "normal" stops and 55.5 million
foot-pounds in one return to launch site (RTLS) stop, co_nonly referred to as an abort landing
without failure. The certification test program verified these requirements could be met.
It must be pointed out at this t_De that the brake assembly certification document was dated
August 1977. This was well over 3-1/2 years before the flight of STS-I. And because of the increased
landing weights, changes in wheel and axle configuration, impact of crosswinds and other factors,
certain brakes have been operated in the energy range which exceeds the reuse refurbishment
capability during the STS flights. For example, the brakes were designed for use on five landings
with the maximum Orbiter landing weight of 188,000 pounds (32K pound payload) and refurbishable,
followed by an emergency landing weight of 227,000 pounds (65K payload) with no reuse. Under these
requirements all landings above 188,000 pounds were considered an emergency and, therefore, could
result in the loss of the brakes. To date and for future planning all Orbiter landings have been
above i88,000 pounds.
Vlll. BPJ, EE PERFORMANCE DURING STS FLIGHTS
Brake pressure data obtained after the STS-I landing indicated a considerably higher pressure
was present at the right inboard brake than for the right outboard brake. This discrepancy was
traced to a faulty connection in the brake skid control box. However, inspection of the right
inboard brake showed that damage to the No. 3 rotor drive slot had occurred. The damage was determined
to be lack of complete engagement between the wheel drive lug channels and the rotor drive slot face.
Because of axle deflection relative to the brake assembly centerline, there is axial movement
between the wheel lug and rotor slots as the wheel rotates. This axial in and out relative motion
caused the end of the channel to displace the beryllium material at the rotor drive slot face
outboard.
New longer channels were installed for STS-2 and post landing inspection revealed no further
brake damage,
Initial inspection of brakes assemblies used on STS-3 and STS-4 and subsequent analysis
revealed that the relative deflection between the wheel/brake/axle combination allow contact between
rotating and stationary parts of the brakes and wheels. There was contact between the rotor I.D.
and the torque tube lugs and between the atator O.D. and wheel lugs. Also, there was wear and
displaced metal at some rotor drive slots. Subsequent inspection made by removing the carbon
linings disclosed that beryllium carbide not previously visible, had for_d in localized areas
beneath the linings on both the rotors and stators (See Figure 8).
In this same time frame, the landing of STS-5 took place. During the last 50 feet of the
landing roll, the left inboard tire skidded for $0 feet and than rolled the last 10 feet. When the
brake assembly was disassembled, it was found that the No. 3 stator was broken into 5 segments.
An in-depth analysis of all the available data from STS-1 through -5 and the qualification test
report established these conclusions.
1. Beryllium carbide formations are occurring in local '_ot spots" on rotors and stators
of brake assemblies that are approaching or exceeding the reusability energy limit
of 36.5 million foot-pounds. These formations occur when beryllium reaches its
melting polntof approximately 2400°F.
2. Beat generation is not distributed evenly across the lining surfaces in a radial
direction, thereby causing local "hot spots" and results in carbide formations.
3. Carbide formation causes a bulge in the lining thus increasing the localized contact
pressure and thereby self-perpetuates the temperature increase and carbide formation.
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4. Heavy braking at high velocity and extended braking causes the '_ot spots" to increase
in size and spread to include the structural load path sections, resulting in starer
failure.
5. Detection of beryllium carbide requires removal of linings. Beryllium carbide, upon
cooling, is a porous material and leaves a pocket in the disk at the "hot spot." If
the brake is reused, a new "hot spot" can form in a new locatioo radially under the
lining face.
6. Heat generation is not distributed evenly along the length of the brake assembly.
Recurs and scarers closer tO the back plate show larger carbide formations than
those close to the pressure plate. The formations are slightly lar_er at the bottom
of the stator than at the top.
7. Brake on time during qual test reusability stops did not exceed 22 seconds. Brake on
time for the flights has ranged from 26 seconde (STS-2) with no damage to 52 seconds
(STS-5) with the failed starer.
8. Differential braking in a crosswind increases the potential for brake damage and
reduces the total brake energy capability available for stoppin_.
9. Continued use of the brakes close to or exceeding the refurbishment limit will reduce
the reusability capability of the'assembly.
lO. The starer failure on STS-5 was the result of lose of starer strength due to high
heat build-up from "extended" medium to heavy braking.
iio Failure of a starer or rotor is nor a safety issue, Lose of one or all stature
reduces braking capability but does not cause complete loss. The brake would act
as a single rotor brake in the case of an all starer failure.
Prior to STS-6, a support bracket was added to the brake assembly which fits between the torque
tube I.D. and the axle O.D.. The purpose of the bracket is to reduce the relative deflection between
the axle and brake assembly during landing re,lout.
Inspection of the brakes after STS-_ landing did, indeed, show that the bracket eliminated
the contact noted on previous flights. However, two brake assemblies approached the refurbishable
energy level (34°7 and 32.6 million, respectively) reeultin$ in carbide formations. In addition,
three orators in one other brake had cracks in the beryllium. Theee cracks were traced to the
forced interference fit of the "T" retainer spacer which caused ecratches in the beryllium and
subsequently caused crack propagation during brake nee.
This condition hae bean corrected by rework on the brake assembliee installed on STS-7 as
well as the addition of steel clips on the rotor and starer drive clot face|. The clips were
added to eliminate the galling of the beryllium at slot faces caueed by the relative motion of the
drive keys and disks. An evaluation of the cllp performance will be made after the STS-7 landing.
/
B. F. Goodrich is presently performing a study to determine the feasibility of increasing the
brake energy capacity within the preeent limited sp_ce that is available, thereby increaein_ the
refurbishment capability.
VIII. SUIeL_Y
The Orbiter wheels and brakes have been subjected to an extremely rigorous test program which
far exceeds those used for any wheel and brake presently used in the aerospace industry. Changing
requirements, increasing load conditions, and the use of landing load profiles has been the major
contributor to the problems which occurred during the certification program and the Space Shuttle STS
flights.
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